

Contents

Acknowledgements	i
Contents	ii
Introduction	1
1 Risk Sharing and the Efficiency of Public Good Provision under Tax Competition	8
1.1 Introduction	8
1.2 The Model	12
1.2.1 Household Behavior	13
1.2.2 Firm Behavior	15
1.3 Centralized Government Policy Choice	18
1.4 Tax Competition	20
1.5 Conclusions	28
2 The Implications of Introducing Cross-Border Loss-Offset in the European Union	31
2.1 Introduction	31
2.2 The Model	35
2.3 Social Planner's Choice	43
2.4 Tax Competition	45
2.4.1 Competition for Real Investment	46
2.4.2 Competition for Physical Capital and Profits	49
2.5 Simulation	52
2.6 Discussion and Extensions	54
2.7 Conclusions	57
3 Tax Competition and Macroeconomic Imbalances when Capital Markets are Imperfect	59
3.1 Introduction	59
3.2 The Model	62
3.2.1 Households	63
3.2.2 Firms	65
3.2.3 The Financial Intermediary	65
3.2.4 Capital and Goods Market Equilibria	67

3.2.5	Wealth and Accumulation of Net Foreign Assets	68
3.3	Equilibrium Dynamics and Steady State	69
3.4	Fiscal Policy	76
3.4.1	Decentralized Economy	77
3.4.2	Centralized Economy	79
3.4.3	Increase in the Risk Premium	80
3.5	Numerical Analysis	84
3.6	Conclusions	89
Conclusion		90
A Appendix A		93
B Appendix B		96
B.1	Solving the Maximization Problem of MNEs	96
B.2	Derivation of the Comparative Statics Results (2.6)-(2.7)	97
B.3	Derivation of the Equilibrium Loss-Offset When Utility is Represented by (2.28)	99
C Appendix C		101
C.1	Derivation of the Household's First-Order Conditions	101
C.2	Derivation of the Time Paths of $\alpha(t), k(t), \sigma(t), k^*(t)$	102
C.3	Derivation of the Impact of Risk Premium Changes on Tax Rates	105
C.4	Robustness Checks	107
Bibliography		108